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NOTES
servitude of article 665 and, therefore, can only receive the
previous year's assessment value as compensation.
A repeal of the levee servitude under article 665 would not
hurt Louisiana. Any land needed for the purpose could readily
be obtained through expropriation and the added cost will not
be so great as to overshadow the good that this change would
bring about. The flood control program is for the benefit of all
the state and all taxpayers should share the burden. The cost of
other public works is distributed in an equitable manner and
flood control should be no exception.
John W. Jewell
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE-BLOOD TESTS-
DUE PROCESS
The automobile petitioner was driving skidded and struck
a tree. Suspecting that he had been drinking, police arrested
him at a hospital where he was being treated. A sample of
Schmerber's blood drawn by a physician over his objection was
used as evidence to convict him of driving while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor. The United States Supreme Court
.affirmed, held,1 the privilege against self-incrimination protects
an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself
or from otherwise providing the state with evidence of a testi-
monial or communicative nature. The taking of blood was jus-
tified and under reasonable conditions, therefore petitioner's
1. Decision was 54 with Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas,
and Fortas dissenting. The Chief Justice assigned his reasoning in Breitpaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) as the basis for his present dissent; Justices
Douglas and Fortas also cited Warren's Breithaupt dissent. Breithaupt involved
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter on evidence of intoxication supplied
by a blood sample taken from the accused while he was unconscious by a physi-
cian under medically proper conditions. Justice Douglas. felt that the true
issue was the right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) and that the right coincided with the fourth amendment right of
persons to be secure "in their persons." He felt that there was a clear invasion
of personal dignity and privacy in the case at hand (cf. State v. Findlay, 145
N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1966), where the Iowa Supreme Court held that the taking
of a blood sample from an unconscious defendant was not an unreasonable
invasion of privacy and that in view of bodily assimilation of alcohol an emer-
gency existed justifying taking the sample though defendant was not under
arrest, and that the procedure did not constitute brutality or deprive defendant
of due process of law; it was another automobile case). Justice Fortas felt that
the states have no right to commit violence upon a person, or to make use of
the results of such violence, and that the extraction of blood, over protest, was
an act of violence.
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right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
not violated. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
The instant case raises three constitutional questions: (1)
Is it violative of due process to admit in evidence testimony
based on the chemical analysis of a blood test obtained over an
accused's objection? 2 (2) Does such procedure contravene the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination?3 (3) Is it an un-
reasonable search and seizure ?4
The Due Process Claim
In addition to using the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to apply sections of the Bill of Rights to the states,
the Court has used the clause of its own force without reference
to specific articles of the Bill of Rights, to declare unconscionable
activities unconstitutional. Under this latter approach, the
Court attempted to define fundamental rights in cases of intru-
sion into the human body for evidence in Rochin v. California,5
where Justice Frankfurter stated that convictions would not be
sustained if secured by methods that "shock the conscience." 6
In the instant case the Court summarily rejected Schmer-
ber's due process challenge by reaffirming Breithaupt v. Abram,7
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... "
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall . . . be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself ...."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin three deputy sheriffs entered the defend-
ant's home without a search warrant and forced open the door to his room.
Inside they found Rochin sitting partly dressed on the side of the bed, upon
which his wife was lying. Rochin immediately seized two capsules which were
on a night stand nearby and attempted to swallow them. The deputies strug-
gled with him in an attempt to prevent his swallowing of them but failed.
Rochin was then handcuffed and taken to a hospital where an emetic solution
was forced through a tube into his stomach against his will, causing him to
regurgitate the capsules. The capsules were found to contain morphine and
were used to convict him of possession of morphine, a misdemeanor.
6. Id. at 172.
7. 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (affirming a conviction of involuntary manslaugh-
ter). Decision was 6-3 with Warren, Black, and Douglas dissenting. The Chief
Justice felt that the case was indistinguishable in principle from Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Justices Black and Douglas felt that the con-
cept of due process should not be limited to a prohibition of force and violence
against an accused, but equally prohibits the violation by the police of the sanc-
tity of the body of an unconscious man. They also felt that the accused had
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where, as in the present case, the extraction of blood was made
in a medically acceptable environment by a physician. The only
distinction was that Breithaupt was unconscious at the time and
had no opportunity to object.8 The majority felt that under
such circumstances the taking was not offensive, did not "shock
the conscience" nor offend "a sense of justice"9 even though the
accused objected.
In Breithaupt the petitioner had invoked Rochin, which in-
validated a state conviction based on evidence of morphine
capsules extracted by force from the accused's stomach. The
majority, however, distinguished the case and cited the absence
of offensive conduct in Breithaupt. It also noted the common-
place nature of blood tests and the fact that most states admit
the results of such tests in evidence. 10 The majority of state
and federal courts have adopted an unduly strict construction of
Rochin and will not invalidate the proceedings unless there has
been shocking force and almost flagrant abuse of the person."
been made to furnish evidence against himself and that any form of compulsion
to these ends was improper.
8. See dissenting opinions of Justices Warren and Douglas in Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), which imply that had petitioner been conscious
and objected to the proceedings the Court would have reversed his conviction
and held the procedure invalid. "This implies that a different result might fol-
low if petitioner had been conscious and had voiced his objection. I reject the
distinction." Warren, dissenting opinion, id. at 441. "As I understand today's
decision there would be a violation of due process if the blood had been with-
drawn from the accused after a struggle with the police." Douglas, dissenting,
id. at 443.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
10. 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957) (majority opinion, Clark, J.). Justice Clark
cites 47 states using chemical tests (Louisiana not included) to aid in deter-
rnination of intoxication in cases involving charges of driving while intoxicated;
23 sanctioning the practice by statute and the others by court approval. In
footnote 3 Justice Clark offers the proposition that: "The fact that so many
States make use of the tests negatives the suggestion that there is anything
offensive about them." Id. at 437. See for excellent discussion of the advantages
of a compulsory test statute- problems of proof and reliable methods of estab-
lishing fact, Rosenberg, Compulsory Intoxication Tests: A Suggestion for Massa-
chusetts, 50 MASs. L.Q. 145 (1965) : "And while federal standards relative
to self-incrimination must now be applied as a minimum the states will be per-
fectly free to interpret their own constitutional provisions in a manner which
would not allow compulsory blood tests even if the federal standard permits
them." Id. at 153. See also Note, 18 Wyo. L.J. 252 (1964) (implied consent
statutes) ; Lynch, Blood Tests in Motor Vehicle Prosecutions, 32 N.Z.L.J. 184
(1956) (possible ethical objections by medical profession to compulsory statutes) ;
Should There Be a Statute Authorizing Chemical Tests for Determining Intoxri-
cation of Drivers? Yes No, 39 MIcH. STATE B.J. 20 (1960) (pro-con discus-
sion).
11. People v. Dawson, 127 Cal. App. 2d 375, 273 P.2d 938 (1954) (arrest-
ing officer placed a neckhold on accused and forced him to relinquish a packet
of narcotics from his mouth) ; State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1955)
(accused was strapped in a chair and his head involuntarily held so that his
breath could be obtained for a drunkometer test); People v. Duroneclay, 146
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These cases reason that it was the whole chain of events that
shocked the conscience in Rochin, beginning with the illegal in-
vasion of Rochin's home and the struggle to free the capsules
from his mouth, and not just the lack of consent or the use of the
stomach pump.12
The Fifth Amendment Claim
Petitioner's second challenge was that the admission of blood
test results was violative of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 13 In the pre-Malloy v. Hogan14 cases the issue was the
presence or absence of force and brutality-the due process ap-
proach. With Malloy applying the fifth amendment to the
states, however, is no longer left to individual determination
of the scope of the privilege and the crucial factor is whether
the form of disclosure involved falls within the fifth amendment
privilege. 15
Cal. App. 2d 96, 303 P. 2d 617 (1956) (arm of accused held in an attempt
to secure a blood sample because he had previously withdrawn it). All of these
cases held no violation of due process. But cf. People v. Martinez, 130 Cal. App.
2d 54, 278 P.2d 938 (1954) (police wrestled with accused and forced him to
surrender package of narcotics from his mouth, held violation of due process).
See the recent case of Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966)
(government agents held suspect's arms and head while a doctor inserted a tube
through his nose and into his stomach; saline solution allowed to gravitate into
stomach causing two packets of heroin to be expelled from suspect's stomach;
held not an unreasonable search and seizure). See also cases cited where federal
courts have upheld searches where evidence was extracted from anus of arrested
person and used in evidence against him. Id. at 874-75; where emetics have been
employed to retrieve narcotics which had been swallowed, id. at 875.
12. See especially Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966),
where the majority distinguished Rochin on this very ground. A concurring
opinion stressed the fact that the methods used and the conduct pursued in
Rochin were not the methods used or conduct pursued in the instant case. A
strong dissent argued that the case was similar to Rochin. The majority thought
the case more comparable to Breithaupt than Rochin.
13. All states except Iowa and New Jersey incorporate this guarantee by
means of constitutional provision. These two states guarantee the privilege by
statute. 8 WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940). The pertinent Louisiana
provision is La. CONST. art. I, § 11, providing, principally: "No person shall be
compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceed-
ing that may subject him to criminal prosecution . .1.." See generally Inbau,
Should We Abolish the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 45
J. CaRIt. L., C. & P.S. 180 (1954) ; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construc-
tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1930).
14. 378 U.S. 1 (1964), reversing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
15. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, noted that a prerequisite
to consideration of the search and seizure claim was the assumption that the
form of disclosure involved did not fall within the protection of the fifth amend-
ment; otherwise the disclosure could not legally be subject to a search and
seizure. The self-incrimination claim was also crucial to Schmerber's limited
right to counsel claim. Schmerber had refused to consent on the advice of
counsel and claimed that failure to honor this advice denied him of his sixth
amendment right. This claim was summarily rejected on the ground that since
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Prior to the instant case the majority of federal and state
courts held that compulsory submission to blood, urine, saliva,
or breath tests did not force an accused to supply evidence
against himself and that historically the privilege has been
limited to compulsion to obtain testimony. 16 The Supreme Court
first adopted its restrictive view in Holt v. United States,7 where
Justice Holmes explained that:
"[T]he prohibition of compelling a criminal to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
(Emphasis added.) 1 8
The federal standard, therefore, established a distinction be-
tween testimonial and demonstrative, or real evidence.
The majority reaffirmed this basic distinction and held that
the privilege protected Schmerber to the extent that he could
Schmerber was not entitled to assert the privilege he was not given a greater
right because his attorney erroneously advised him that he could assert it.
16. "Looking back at the history of the privilege and the spirit of the struggle
by which its establishment came about, the object of the protection seems plain.
It is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an
admission of guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence. Such was
the process of the ecclesiastical Court, as opposed through two centuries- the
inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath, in order to supply
the lack of the required two witnesses. Such was the complaint of Lilburn and
his fellow-objectors, that he ought to be convicted by other evidence and not
by his own forced confession under oath ....
"... In other words, it is not any and every compulsion that is the kernel of
the privilege in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial com-
pulsion. The one idea is as essential as the other.
"The general principle, therefore, in regard to the form of the protected dis-
closure, may be said to be this: The privilege protects a person from any dis-
closure sought by legal process against him as a witness." 8 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940), cases cited id. § 2265; cases also cited in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, n.8 (1966) ; cf. United States v. Nesmith, 121
F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954), holding specifically that a urine specimen does not
come within the ambit of the privilege. Cases collected in Annot., 164 A.L.R. 967
(1946), supplemented by Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
17. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
18. Id. at 252-53. In Holt, the defendant had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the errors assigned was that the accused
had been compelled to try on a blouse which the authorities claimed belonged
to him. A witness for the prosecution testified that he had seen the accused
put on the blouse and that it fitted him. Held, affirmed. Defendant had not
been compelled to serve as a witness against himself by the Court's requiring
him to try on the blouse. Justice Holmes referred to the possible inclusion of
physical evidence within the scope of the privilege as an "extravagant extension
of the Fifth Amendment." Ibid. The Supreme Court of Colorado elaborated
somewhat on this language from Holt in Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 300 P.2d
545 (1956) by stating that: "Our Constitution (Colorado) protects one against
an admission of guilt coming from his own lips under compulsion and against
the will of the accused, and has no relatian whatever to real as distinguished
from testimonial evidence." (Emphasis added.)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
not be compelled to testify against himself, or to otherwise fur-
nish evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, but
that it did not extend to a non-communicative blood test. Jus-
tice Brennan cited Miranda v. Arizona" for the proposition that
the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by
the values it helps to protect. Although it is clear that the scope
of the privilege could include the accused's communications,
whatever form they might take, both federal and state courts
have held that the protection of the privilege does not embrace
compulsion to submit to photographing, measurements, finger-
printing, to write or to speak for identification, to appear in
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a par-
ticular gesture. 2
In his dissent, Justice Black rejected the majority's use of
the terms "testimonial" and "communicative" to restrict the
privilege. He pointed out that the latest edition of Professor
Wigmore's treatise translates "testimonial" to mean "communi-
cative" 21 and contended that these terms were "not models of
clarity and precision ' 22 that could be properly used in defining
the ambit of the privilege. He claimed that the purpose of the
blood test was to obtain "testimony" in that it supplied informa-
tion to ultimately enable a witness to "communicate" to the
court the fact of intoxication. Justice Black found the majority's
approval of Boyd v. United States23 inconsistent with its strict
construction in the present case and commented:
"It is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the State
to extract a human being's blood to convict him of a crime
because of the blood's content but proscribes compelled pro-
duction of his lifeless papers .... In such a situation blood
is not oral testimony given by an accused but it can
certainly 'communicate' to a court and jury the fact of
guilt."24
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. See note 16 8upra.
21. 8 WIGMoRE, EVWDENcE 378 § 2263 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
22. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
23. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). It was said there that: "A close and literal con-
struction (of constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property)
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
the stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. at 635.
24. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. XXVII
NOTES
He found the majority's reference to Miranda inept and a poor
support for its holding, and asserted that the interpretive con-
stitutional philosophy there was in harmony with Boyd and
should have been applied in the present case. It is submitted
that Justice Black disregarded Holt and its distinction between
testimonial and real or demonstrative evidence, and that Holt
controls. Justice Black's argument against the majority's ter-
minology is answered by an analysis of the distinction between
testimonial or communicative evidence and non-communicative
or nontestimonial evidence. If the evidence depends upon the
testimony of one other than the accused to convey ideas or in-
formation it is not itself communicative or testimonial. On the
other hand, if the evidence itself conveys information or ideas
it is communicative or testimonial. Justice Black argues that
the source of the act should control, whereas the majority con-
siders the nature of the product of the act and not the source.
The Fourth Amendment Claim
In considering Schmerber's search and seizure claim, Justice
Brennan, speaking for the majority, noted that a similar chal-
lenge had been urged in Breithaupt,21 but had been summarily
dismissed because of Wolf v. Colorado,2 which held that evidence
obtained from an illegal search and seizure could be admitted
in state prosecutions. Since Mapp v. Ohio had overruled Wolf,
the issue of the constitutionality of the compulsory blood test
was squarely presented. The questions to be answered were
(1) whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to
submit to the test, and (2) whether the means employed in the
taking of the blood were proper.
Although the majority recognized that more justification
for intrusions into the human body must exist than the mere
chance of obtaining desired evidence, they concluded that the
procedure here in question was justified because the police offi-
cer might reasonably have believed he was confronted with an
emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant
threatened "the destruction of evidence. '27 The emergency re-
sulted from the fact that the percentage of alcohol in the blood
diminishes shortly after drinking stops. The securing of evi-
25. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
26. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
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dence of blood-alcohol content was as an appropriate incident to
the arrest.
The Court answered the second question by restating its rea-
soning in Breithaupt that such a blood test was commonplace
and that it had been administered under reasonable conditions
by competent personnel. Although it was concluded that there
had been no violation of the fourth amendment right, Justice
Brennan emphasized that the decision had only been reached
on the facts of the present record, and,
"That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid
the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it
permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under
other conditions. ' 28 (Emphasis added.)
Observations
It is submitted that the majority's traditional approach to
the self-incrimination challenge was sound. Underlying consid-
eration was given to the history and policy of the privilege, and
Holt2 9 supports the view that only compelled personal "commu-
nications" of a self-incriminating nature are protected. Justice
Black's attack on the majority's terminology was answered by
Justice Brennan's explanation that were the words used consist-
ently as Justice Black suggested, all evidence received in court
would be of a "testimonial" or "communicative" nature. He sug-
gested that the fifth amendment does not relate to all acts, but
only those that are communicative. Non-communicative acts,
even though compelled to elicit the testimony of others, are not
protected. Boyd30 was cited as an example of what the Court
considered a communicative act (the writing of personal letters
or other private papers). The Court suggested that participa-
tion in a lie detector test might also be so categorized. In his
concluding remarks, Justice Brennan explained:
"The petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way im-
plicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was
irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemi-
cal analysis ... alone. Since the blood test evidence ... was
neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
28. 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
29. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not
inadmissible on privilege grounds. s3 1 (Emphasis added.)
This language denotes a supplemental distinction between "pas-
sive" and "active" participation by the accused, passive par-
ticipation being outside the protection of the privilege. A simi-
lar distinction was employed by a minority of states as an ap-
proach to their self-incrimination problems before Malloy,32 but
that distinction was between "forced passivity" and "forced ac-
tivity" and should be distinguished from the Supreme Court's
present classification. Forced activity meant compelled coop-
eration by the accused in the acquisition of evidence (breath for
a breath test, putting finger to nose for a sobriety test), where-
as forced passivity was taken to mean compelled submission
supposedly without the need for cooperation of the accused
(blood test). This approach produced an absurd result in that
one could not be compelled to submit to a breath test, but could
be compelled to submit to a blood test.33 In the present case
the Court implied that active participation was that which
tended to produce evidence itself communicative; passive par-
ticipation related to acts productive of evidence itself non-com-
municative.3 4 Professor Wigmore has stated that only state-
ments coming from a "person's own lips" are protected and
that all acts are excluded from the privilege. Justice Black sug-
gested that acts productive of physical evidence upon which
others might testify should be protected. The majority com-
promised by concluding that only acts productive of communi-
cative evidence would be protected.
It is submitted that this supplemental distinction is a valid
and desirable accessory to proper application of the testimonial
31. 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
32. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. See Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 353 (1956); Comment, 1 VAND. L. REV. 243
(1948); cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); McCoRmicK, Evi-
DENCE 265, § 126 (1954).
34. Cf. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-In crimination, 34 MINN. L. REV.
1, 39 (1949) : "Whenever the evidence is confined to descriptions of involuntary
reactions of the accused or to qualities of his body substances beyond his power
of control, its admissibility is clearly justified by the more liberal interpreta-
tion of the constitutional provision. Where, however, he is compelled to do acts
which he can use as a means of conveying ideas, the reception of evidence of
his conduct raises serious questions as to the extent to which practical consid-
erations affecting efficient enforcement of the law under modern conditions may
be safely permitted to limit the right of privacy and personal liberty." (Empha-
sis added.) Cf. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rptr. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381
(1941).
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versus demonstrative or real evidence distinction. The present
test as to exclusion of compelled physical evidence on self-
incrimination grounds is apparently whether the person's act
produces evidence itself communicative, i.e., capable of convey-
ing ideas within the person's power or control. Schmerber con-
cluded that the act of compelled submission to a blood test did
not produce evidence capable of conveying subjective ideas, but
rather related to objective non-testimonial qualities of body sub-
stances. Although the majority did regard the evidence as an
"incriminating product of compulsion," it felt that the privilege
should not be extended to include this type of disclosure. Con-
struing the privilege to include all physical evidence has been
meaningfully described as a lumping together of the privilege
against self-incrimination with "the principles of the rule against
coerced confessions and due process concepts which results in
an unnecessary extension of the privilege."3 5 Although such an
extension might possibly be justified as serving the policies of
the privilege, it would be an undesirable impediment to law
enforcement. Such minor intrusions are outweighed by the
benefits received by society.
By means of its search and seizure analysis, it is suggested
that the Court strikes a correct constitutional balance between
the demands of society for scientific investigation methods and
the rights of the individual. The Court, for the first time, pro-
vides specific guidelines for the application of the Rochin rule
which were heretofore only broadly stated. Its search and sei-
zure standard suggests that bodily invasions will be held valid
only when: (1) the attempt to secure evidence is an appropri-
ate incident to arrest, i.e., that special circumstances must be
present to remove the necessity of a warrant before proceeding
with the test; (2) the intrusion is minor; (3) the extraction
is by a physician in a hospital environment according to ac-
cepted medical practices; (4) the quantity of blood extracted is
small; and (5) the method utilized involves minimal risk of in-
fection, pain, or trauma. The Court's basic due process stand-
ard, that convictions may not be secured by methods that are
brutal or shocking, has eliminated the need for affirmative con-
35. Comment, 49 J. CaIM. L., C. & P.S. 58, 60 (1958). As early as the deci-
sion in Rochin, Black and Douglas favored enlargement of the privilege to in-
clude this form of disclosure. They advocated extension of the privilege to "cap-
sules taken from his stomach, blood taken from his veins .... provided they are
taken from him without his consent." Douglas, J., concurring, 342 U.S. 165,
179 (1952). See also Douglas' dissent in Breithaupt, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957).
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sent and there is no apparent objection to the tests when there
is implied consent or protest without physical resistance. But
how much must an accused resist and how much force can be
exercised to compel him to submit before the procedure becomes
unreasonable-? Rochin represents one extreme of the problem -
the case where there is resistance by the accused and brutal and
shocking conduct is employed to compel submission. Breithaupt
and the present case present the opposite extreme-the case
where there is no resistance by the suspect or accused.
Although the laws of most states are seemingly precise in
stating that reasonable force may be used in the execution of
search warrants,3 6 the gap between use of no force and the use
of shocking force presents a nebulous middle zone. 7 The states
have reached varied and conflicting results and the tendency
is to require brutal force before vitiating the proceedings.3 8
The. best that can be said for these decisions is that they are
inconsistent. For a state to authorize use of whatever force
and means are necessary to compel submission, i.e., to say that
whatever amount of force is needed is reasonable, seems too
broad a grant of power. It is generally viewed as such, with
most of the states expressly stating that it is not the test.3 9 Yet
little is really done to establish a satisfactory standard other
than to suggest that resolution of the problem is necessarily an
ad hoc factual determination of reasonableness. It is felt that
36. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 15 :164 (1950), which makes a cross reference to
15:220 in authorizing the means and force Lpermitted in the execution of a search
warrant. R.S. 15 :220 provides, in pertinent part: "The person making a lawful
arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest an(l detention, and also to
overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested or
detained." Comment (b) to 15:220 states that a requirement of reasonableness
would preclude the use of clearly inappropriate force and states that to impose
a test of actual necessity upon the person arresting would not be just nor sound
policy.
37. Justice Brennan noted that the Court was dealing with a novel aspect of
search and seizure - that of intrusions into the human body - therefore former
limitations as to permissible scope and procedure as well as kinds of property
subject to search and seizure were no longer helpful, the traditional problems
having dealt with intrusions into property relationships or private papers.
"Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body . . . we write on
a clean slate." 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (majority opinion).
38. See note 11 supra.
39. It is submitted that there should be a distinction between the amount of
force which is permissible in making a detention or arrest and the amount of
force which is permissible in executing a search warrant involving a bodily intru-
sion. In the latter case some degree of force short of shocking conduct should
not be permitted. Most commentators recognize the outer limits of the problem,
but it seems a zone of great doubt as to permissible, or reasonable force in this
new area of search and seizure where the Supreme Court now writes on a clean
slate.
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there is some degree of force short of brutality which should
render the procedure unreasonable and therefore violative of
due process. The present criterion protects the individual only
from the more shocking police methods and encourages the well-
informed suspect to resist with great tenacity in hopes of
prompting brutal force to compel submission. It is to this area,
therefore, that we must look to the Court for further clari-
fication.
Larry P. Boudreaux
CRIMINAL LAW -CULPABILITY OF THE CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC
"The following persons are and shall be guilty of va-
grancy: (1) Habitual drunkards; ... Whoever commits
the crimes of vagrancy shall be fined not more than two
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than nine
months, or both."'
"Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the fol-
lowing in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb or
alarm the public: . . . (3) Appearing in an intoxicated
condition .... Whoever commits the crime of disturbing
the peace shall be fined not more than one hundred dol-
lars, or imprisoned for not more than ninety days, or
both.' 2
Three recent decisions have cast doubt on the constitution-
ality of condemning as a criminal the chronic alcoholic who vio-
lates laws analogous to the Louisiana statutes set out above.,
In Robinson v. California,4 the Supreme Court held that a stat-
ute imprisoning a narcotics addict who had not been guilty of
irregular behavior inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
1. LA. R.S. 14:107 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 434, § 1.
2. LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 70, § 1, La. Acts
1963, No. 93, § 1.
3. Most state laws dealing with vagrancy and public drunkenness are similar
and find their origin in early English models: For extensive discussion see Dubin
& Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status
Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes
of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
§3, at 777 (1957).
4. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721 provided: "No person shall use,
or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting
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